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Physical principles underlying biological pattern formation are discussed. In particular, the combination of local self-enhancement and long-range (“lateral”) inhibition (Gierer and Meinhardt, 1972) accounts for de-novo pattern formation, and for striking features of developmental regulation such as induction, spacing and proportion regulation of centers of activation in tissues and cells. Part I explains physical principles of spatial organisation in biological development. Part II demonstrates in mathematical terms that and how short-range activation and long-range inhibition are conditions for the generation of spatial concentration patterns. The conditions can be expressed in terms of ranges, rates and orders of reactions. These conditions, in turn, can also be derived by analysis of dynamic instabilities by means of Fourier waves, showing the neither obvious nor trivial relation between the latter approach and the theory based primarily on autocatalysis and lateral inhibition.
Der Vortrag über den im Titel „Naturwissenschaft und Menschenbild“ umschriebenen Problemkreis, der natur- und kulturwissenschaftliche Aspekte betrifft, bildete den Abschluss des Symposiums über das Thema „Wie entstehen neue Qualitäten in komplexen Systemen“ am 18. Dezember 1998 in Berlin zum 50-jährigen Gründungsjubiläum der Max-Planck-Gesellschaft. Schwerpunkte sind Reichweite und Grenzen naturwissenschaftlicher Erklärung von Bewusstsein, evolutionsbiologische Grundlagen von Kooperativität und Empathie, sowie die kulturellen Verallgemeinerungs- und Gestaltungsmöglichkeiten biologisch angelegter Fähigkeiten, insbesondere was die Aktivierung der fragilen und begrenzten, aber durchaus realen und wichtigen Ressource „Gemeinsinn“ angeht.
Validity of physical laws for any aspect of brain activity and strict correlation of mental to physical states of the brain do not imply, with logical necessity, that a complete algorithmic theory of the mind-body relation is possible. A limit of decodability may be imposed by the finite number of possible analytical operations which is rooted in the finiteness of the world. It is considered as a fundamental intrinsic limitation of the scientific approach comparable to quantum indeterminacy and the theorems of logical undecidability. An analysis of these limits, applied to dispositions of future behaviour, suggests that limits of decodability of the psycho-physic relation may actually exist with respect to brain states with self-referential aspects, as they are involved in mental processes. Limits for an algorithmic theory of the mind-body problem suggested by this study are formally similar to other intrinsic limits of the scientific method such as quantum indeterminacy and mathematical undecidability which are also related to self-referential operations. At the metatheoretical level, hard sciences, despite their reliability, universality and objectivity, depend on metatheoretical presuppositions which allow for multiple philosophical interpretations.
In diesem Buch zeigt der Physiker und Biologe Alfred Gierer - er ist Direktor am Max-Planck- Institut für Entwicklungsbiologie - die Reichweite, aber auch die prinzipiellen Grenzen naturwissenschaftlichen Denkens auf. Beides wird nirgends so deutlich wie im Verhältnis der Biologie zur Physik: Hier stellen sich die Fragen, was Leben ist, wie es entstand und sich bis zur Höhe des Menschen entwickelte, wie der Reichtum der Formen zu verstehen ist und in welcher Beziehung das Bewußtsein, die “Seele”, zu einem wissenschaftlichen Verständnis der Lebensvorgänge steht. “Die Physik, das Leben und die Seele” informiert über diese wichtigen Zusammenhänge in allgemeinverständlicher Form und regt in besonderem Maße die Freude am kritischen Mitdenken an. Das Buch schlägt einen weiten Bogen von der Grundlagen der Physik und Logik über die neuen Erkenntnisse der Biologie bis zu der Frage, was uns die Naturwissenschaften über den Menschen und sein Bewußtsein lehren können - und was nicht.
Aside from the increasing, impressive evidence on chemical identification of graded molecules involved, it is the capability of axons for approaching the target position from different aspects in a two-dimensional field which is per se a strong indication for the involvement of gradients. Targeting requires, in the target field, counter-graded effects, either by antagonistic gradients, or by a single gradient in each dimension exerting attractive effects at low, reverting to inhibitory (repulsive) effects at high concentrations. A further requirement for mapping is the modulation of the counter-graded effects by components of the growth cone itself which depends on the origin of the corresponding axon.Transduction and processing of graded signals in the navigating growth cones are proposed to be strongly enhanced by intra-growth-cone pattern formation. The concept also encompasses regulatory and branching processes including the formation of the terminal arbors.
Modern science, based on the laws of physics, claims validity for all events in space and time. However, it also reveals its own limitations, such as the indeterminacy of quantum physics, the limits of decidability, and, presumably, limits of decodability of the mind-brain relationship. At the philosophical level, these intrinsic limitations allow for different interpretations of the relation between human cognition and the natural order. In particular, modern science may be logically consistent with religious as well as agnostic views of humans and the universe. These points are exemplified through the transcript of a discussion between Kurt Gödel and Rudolf Carnap that took place in 1940. Gödel, discoverer of mathematical undecidability, took a proreligious view; Carnap, one of the founders of analytical philosophy, an antireligious view. By the time of the discussion, Carnap had liberalized his ideas on theoretical concepts of science: he believed that observational terms do not suffice for an exhaustive definition of theoretical concepts. Then, responded Gödel, one should formulate a theory or metatheory that is consistent with scientific rationality, yet also encompasses theology. Carnap considered such theories unproductive. The controversy remained unresolved, but its emphasis shifted from rationality to wisdom, not only in the Gödel-Carnap discussion but also in our time.
The development of modern science has depended strongly on specific features of the cultures involved; however, its results are widely and transculturally accepted and applied. The science and technology of electricity, for example, emerged as a specific product of post-Renaissance Europe, rooted in the Greek philosophical tradition that encourages explanations of nature in theoretical terms. It did not evolve in China presumably because such encouragement was missing. The transcultural acceptance of modern science and technology is postulated to be due, in part, to the common biological dispositions underlying human cognition, with generalizable capabilities of abstract, symbolic and strategic thought. These faculties of the human mind are main prerequisites for dynamic cultural development and differentiation. They appear to have evolved up to a stage of hunters and gatherers perhaps some 100 000 years ago. However, the extent of the correspondence between some constructions of the human mind and the order of nature, as revealed by science, is a late insight of the last two centuries. Unless we subscribe to extreme forms of constructivism or historical relativism, we may take the success and the formal structure of science as indications of a close, intrinsic relation between the physical and the mental, between the order of nature and the structure of human cognition. At the metatheoretical level, however, modern science is consistent with philosophical and cultural diversity.
Unsere Kulturfähigkeit ist ein Ergebnis der biologischen Evolution der Spezies “Mensch”; die einzelne Kultur selbst jedoch ist ein Produkt gesellschaftlicher Entwicklungen, Differenzierungen und Traditionen. Der Kulturvergleich zeigt uns erhebliche Spielräume für Ausprägungen von Gemeinsinn. Da dessen Aktivierung wesentlich zur Lebensqualität einer Gesellschaft beiträgt, sind Versuche einer realistischen Einschätzung kultureller Gestaltungsspielräume in dieser Hinsicht sinnvoll. Sie sind nicht zuletzt durch die biologischen Grund- und Randbedingungen der Spezies Mensch gegeben und begrenzt, zumal hinsichtlich von Anlagen zu altruistischem und kooperativem Verhalten. Während bis vor kurzem Soziobiologen und Sozialwissenschaftler oft wenig Neigung zu gegenseitigem Verständnis zeigten, zumal manche Biologen relativ extreme Theorien über genetisch angelegte egoistische Verhaltensanlagen vertraten, verstehen sich neuere, durch die Spieltheorie beeinflusste und sehr allgemeine psychische Disposition betonende Linien soziobiologischen Denkens dazu, auch ausgesprochen freundliche Eigenschaften unserer Spezies zu erklären und zu begründen. Sie kommen sozialwissenschaftlichen Bestrebungen entgegen, zum Beispiel in Zusammenhang mit Theorien begrenzt rationalen Verhaltens, in denen die Fairness eine wesentliche Rolle spielt. Besondere Aufmerksamkeit verdienen in diesem Zusammenhang die biologisch angelegte Fähigkeit zu kognitionsgestützter Empathie sowie die fragile Anlage “Vertrauensbereitschaft”, von denen die Effizienz und das Wohlbefinden in einer Gesellschaft wesentlich abhängen. Insgesamt kann eine - keineswegs unkritische - Beachtung evolutionsbiologischer Aspekte menschlicher Verhaltensdispositionen zu einer realistischen Einschätzung der knappen Ressource “Gemeinsinn” beitragen. Sie ist in Grenzen durchaus ein auch in der Natur des Menschen angelegtes Potential. Dies ist jedoch - unter Beachtung eben dieser Grenzen - behutsam zu aktivieren. Moralische Überforderungen, welche die natürlichen Anlagen des Menschen missachten, sind kontraproduktiv.
The topic of this article is the relation between bottom-up and top-down, reductionist and “holistic” approaches to the solution of basic biological problems. While there is no doubt that the laws of physics apply to all events in space and time, including the domains of life, understanding biology depends not only on elucidating the role of the molecules involved, but, to an increasing extent, on systems theoretical approaches in diverse fields of the life sciences. Examples discussed in this article are the generation of spatial patterns in development by the interplay of autocatalysis and lateral inhibition; the evolution of integrating capabilities of the human brain, such as cognition-based empathy; and both neurobiological and epistemological aspects of scientific theories of consciousness and the mind.
Biological evolution and technological innovation, while differing in many respects, also share common features. In particular, the implementation of a new technology in the market is analogous to the spreading of a new genetic trait in a population. Technological innovation may occur either through the accumulation of quantitative changes, as in the development of the ocean clipper, or it may be initiated by a new combination of features or subsystems, as in the case of steamships. Other examples of the latter type are electric networks that combine the generation, distribution, and use of electricity, and containerized transportation that combines standardized containers, logistics, and ships. Biological evolution proceeds, phenotypically, in many small steps, but at the genetic level novel features may arise not only through the accumulation of many small, common mutational changes, but also when distinct, relatively rare genetic changes are followed by many further mutations. New evolutionary directions may be initiated by, in particular, some rare combinations of regulatory sections within the genome. The combinatorial type of mechanism may not be a logical prerequisite for biological innovation, but it can be efficient, especially when novel features arise out of already highly developed systems. Such is the case with the evolution of general, widely applicable capabilities of the human brain. Hypothetical examples include the evolution of strategic thought, which encompasses multiple self-representations, cognition-based empathy, meta-levels of abstraction, and symbolic language. These capabilities of biologically modern man may have been initiated, perhaps some 150 000 years ago, by one or few accidental but distinct combinations of modules and subroutines of gene regulation which are involved in the generation of the neural network in the cerebral cortex. This hypothesis concurs with current insights into the molecular biology of the combinatorial and hierarchical facets of gene regulation that underlie brain development. A theory of innovation encompassing technological as well as biological development cannot per se dictate alternative explanations of biological evolution, but it may help in adding weight and directing attention to notions outside the mainstream, such as the hypothesis that few distinct genetic changes were crucial for the evolution of modern man.